The Euro Area (Eurozone, or EZ) is navigating uncharted waters; it has started, in slow motion, to slide towards a fiscal federation, while still lacking both the fiscal capacity and the democratic qualification to achieve this goal. Strengthening the EMU's democratic profile is a fundamental requirement for the sustainability of the EMU as much as its completion with a fiscal and economic arm. Yet, according to the Five Presidents Report released in 2015, no substantial progress is expected to be achieved before 2025. Against this background, this paper is structured in two parts. The first part analyses the most recent trends in the Governance of the Eurozone. The second part discusses whether a transition from governance to government of the Monetary Union is both feasible and effective, advancing a new proposal -a Joint Budgetary Procedure-tailored to strengthen the European Semester with stronger incentive mechanisms, greater reach and stronger governance.
Introduction
The Euro Area is navigating uncharted waters; it has begun, in slow motion, to slide towards a fiscal federation. However, it currently lacks both the fiscal capacity and the democratic qualification to achieve this goal. Politicisation and democratisation are fundamental requirements for the sustainability of the EMU as much as its completion with a fiscal and economic arm. The weak point of the EMU has been known since before its inception; while the rationale for a monetary union fiscal capacity could be tracked back to Mundell's (1960 Mundell's ( , 1961 work on Optimal Currency Areas, whose common budget would allow several adjustment functions (De Grauwe, 2012) , the actual strengthening of EU budgetary powers was proposed by McDougall (1977) who reported that a budget of 7% of EU GDP would have been necessary to support the Monetary Union Plan presented by Werner (1971) .
I Yet, there is today little appetite in European Capitals for a further pooling of sovereignty and resources in the short run. Although "the long overhaul", recently agreed at the EU level, is still contested, the timeline proposed by the Five Presidents' Report in 2015 is realistic. Calls for a more politicised and legitimised economic governance have multiplied in the second half of 2015 (Zuleeg, 2015; Terzi, 2015) . Yet, while the process of politicisation of EU public life and institutions has fascinated many scholars for many years, it provoked minimal excitement among the public at large until recent years. The crisis, however, has contributed to change this picture; from antiAusterity protesters to opportunistic politicians, Europe has witnessed a growing rhetoric against the "unelected bureaucrats" (courtesy of Nigel Farage, (2014)) taking decisions instead of the people. The academic politicisation debate has focused, over time, on two interdependent strands: the first concerns the changing role of the European Commission, while the second investigates the emergence of the European Parliament as key actor in EU policy making, bringing the traditional right/left divide in European politics.
In particular, Hix (2011 Hix ( , 2013 Hix ( , 2014 
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like Viviane Schmidt (2006: 223) to argue that the EU is creating "policies without politics". A contrasting argument is made by Majone (1997) and Moravcsik (2002) , who argue that as long as the EU deals primarily with non-redistributive policies, it does not need politicisation and can better pursue its goals, being kept "insulated" from party politics.
However, Majone (2014) recognises that, in the wake of the crisis, integration of redistributive policies has taken place and thus politicisation should follow. A politicisation narrative has often been developed as a solution to the alleged "democratic deficit" of the European Union, which is discussed in detail by . In general, politicisation has been perceived as a consequence of ever-increasing powers of the European Union, resulting from both a bottom-up process (the electorate's change in attitudes "from permissive consensus to restrictive dissensus", as argued by Hooghe and Marks (2009) ) and a top-down process, with an incremental self-understanding of the European Commission (and of its president) as the true executive power in the EU (Christiansen, 1997 (Christiansen, , 2001 ). The evolution of the constitutional base of the Union has followed these two trends, strengthening the autonomy and powers of the Commission on the one hand, and reinforcing the link between the Parliament and the European elections on the other. The role of the European Commission has always been stretched between two poles: on the one hand, the Commission was seen as "guardian of the Treaties", i.e. as the supranational enforcer of a multilaterally agreed, rule-based governance; on the other hand, the Commission is increasingly perceived as the "kingmaker" of the European political game, acting instead as the pivotal power in a supranational form of government (Zuleeg, 2015) .
Against this background, this paper is structured in two parts. The first part analyses the most recent trends in the Governance of the Eurozone, focusing, in particular, on the debate on fiscal rules. We then show that a transition from governance to government of the Monetary Union is both feasible and effective; finally the paper advances an alternative proposal to strengthen Economic Governance before 2025, a "Joint Budgetary Procedure" aiming to reinforce the European Semester with a fiscal pillar. A working monetary Union needs three essential functions: a crisis-resolution mechanism, a shock-absorbing capacity, and a system of prevention of asymmetric shocks.
In two fields substantial progress was achieved during the crisis: the strengthening of the fiscal pillar of economic policy coordination, and progress on crisis-resolution mechanisms.
While progress on the creation of a "safety net" in case of crisis was substantially achieved thanks to the creation of the ESM in 2012 and to the factual change of stance of the ECB under the leadership of Mr. Draghi, the Union's capacity to shape a coordinated economic policy, to provide a joint budget, and to enact counter-cyclical expenditure is heavily underdeveloped. Even fiscal rules, as they are conceived today, are not perceived as optimal by member states. Their reform, however, is a major source of division among member states. The original set of fiscal rules of the EU is laid down in articles 121 and 128 of the TFEU and is operationalised by a protocol known as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), established in 1998 and reformed several times thereafter. It was originally organized on two well-known pillars (the "preventive" and "corrective" arms) with three goals: preventing excessive deficits, ensuring debt convergence, and ensuring medium-term deficit reduction. The SGP was first modified in 2005 after German and French failures to comply with deficit thresholds; to avoid sanctioning, a reform was introduced to grant greater autonomy to governments, and weaken the Commission's power of delivering [OMC] " introduced to achieve the goals of the Lisbon 2010 Agenda), the "national reform programmes" that member states had to deliver as a part of the OMC, and the "stability plans" delivered according with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) . The 2011 reform integrated the guidelines into a single document of economic policy, 
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Finally, the last pillar of the genuine economic union agenda -constituted by a shockabsorbing fiscal capacity, notably through a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme (Beblavy and Maselli, 2015; Beblavy et al., 2015) -is in its early stages of exploration, and should not be expected to deliver actual results, let alone a legislative proposal, in the coming years. The Juncker Fund, which formally aims to foster growth through enhancing investment across the EU, appears to work -thanks to its flexibility clauses and to the exclusion of investment contributions from national deficits calculations-rather as a backdoor solution for the introduction of a golden rule rather than as a true fiscal stimulus initiative (for an in-depth discussion of the issue please refer to Nicoli 2016b). The construction of a genuine economic union, however, remains a medium and long term priority for the Euro Area. In this regard, the second part of this paper discusses two alternatives for an incremental process towards the 2025 deadline for the creation of a genuine economic union; a contractual agreements scheme and a joint budgetary procedure. (Tusk, 2016) . Even its proponents realise it differs from democracy so that a new noun-demoi-cracy-had to be minted to mark the difference.
Legitimacy and effectiveness shortcomings
Both interparliamentarism, as it is enacted in today's setting, and intergovernmentalism, require unanimous decision making on fiscal and economic policy, which is a violation of the fundamental principle of democratic decision making; majority voting (Nicoli 2016).
From Governance to Government: an alternative path towards 2025
The previous sections have shown that, despite the undeniable shortcomings of the Eurozone, the EU does have a map, a Captain and a schedule to navigate the uncharted waters of fiscal integration. Yet, while the suggested timeline might be realistic, it is surely overly cautious; for no change (other than cosmetic) is expected to be even discussed before spring 2017, when the Commission is to propose a white paper on the future of the Eurozone (COM 600/2015). Afterwards, negotiations for Treaty Change are set to begin after the German and French elections in 2018 with the new Treaty expected to enter into force by 2025. However, it is evident that this timeline implies no effective change until 2025: muddling through until 2017 and treaty negotiations thereafter. In other words, the existing budget of the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) is not expected to move beyond the 1% GDP threshold for the time being, remaining substantially below central governments' expenditure in existing fiscal federations (table 2) and thus unable to address the shortcomings of the EMU, which would require a minimum of a 2% EMU GDP dedicated budget. While there is no lack of proposals for reform, most existing plans to finalise EMU with fiscal powers (see Pisani-Ferry, Vihriälä and Wolff 2013 for a good summary) rely heavily on Treaty Change, which is not to be expected in the next ten years. 
Rationale behind coordination mechanisms in federal budgets
Macroeconomic theory identifies three leading rationales justifying a federal budget:
providing federal public goods, providing macroeconomic stabilization, and providing incentives for convergence. Existing federal states (for instance the US) tend to emphasize the first pillar, accompanied by some degree of counter-cyclical stabilization mechanisms (federal spending on unemployment benefit, for instance, reached its maximum of 1% of US GDP in 2010 (Kierkegaard, 2015)); adjustment and convergence is usually left to market flexibility, which is not very strong in the EMU (Wolff, 2012) . While the provision of "European common goods" is undoubtedly of great importance, it would require further transfers of competences (for example in the military field) and thus involves Treaty change, which is not discussed in this paper. This section therefore develops the rationale behind providing financial incentives to member-states in order to achieve better coordination, convergence and adjustment. As will be seen in the next section, the European Council and the Commission have discussed different rationales for such a mechanism. On the one hand, the European Council seemed to stress the support for reforms which would enable stronger growth, while the European Commission paid more attention to incentives for reforms aiming towards a coordinated macroeconomic adjustment which is required for Monetary Union stability. Stimulating growth, however, does not represent a sufficient rationale for such a system. Either growth-enhancing reforms are effective, or they aren't. If they are, the incentive is already there and it is represented by the strengthened economic performance of the country in the medium term. Elaborating from Bonatti (2014), we identify four key rationales for providing central financing for reforms and coordination. E -111 a. Catching-up: countries failing to reform their own economic system may be lagging behind in the Euro Area, becoming potentially a liability for all others. Thus, it is justified to provide incentives in the catching-up process.
b. Negative Spillover: introducing certain reforms may provoke severe negative externalities on neighbour countries when such reforms fail to be coordinated; this might be the case, for example, of uncoordinated labour reforms.
c. Coordination added-value: certain policy actions yield higher benefits when they are implemented in a coordinated approach; it is the case, for example, of fiscal stimuli to strengthen demand but also transport and services liberalisation. It is a form of prisoner-dilemma, where countries benefitting less from a liberalisation or a reform would oppose its introduction, but countries benefitting more would not proceed without symmetric implementation.
d. Race-to-the-bottom: when timely coordination is missing, there is a risk of "race to the bottom", which may have high social costs and could undermine support for integration.
Yet, member states falling in the categories above may still find it profitable to enact legislation without the need for the corresponding European financial resources. To justify a system of incentives, a mismatch between costs and benefits of coordination must exist.
When costs and benefits, for some reason, don't match the expectations of the political actors, an effective coordination equilibrium is out of reach. Such "coordination failure" constitutes indeed the main rationale for a centralised financial intervention, having the goal of setting in place an appropriate system of incentives aimed at making effective coordination attractive enough for national elites to act. We individuate, in particular, four types of coordination failures which, if not addressed, may prevent the enacting of a reform programme:
a. The costs of introducing the desired reforms (for example, labour market, retirement, judiciary systems, healthcare, education) exceed the "fiscal space" available for a country, given the set of regulations and treaty obligations in place at EU level (type 1);
b. There is a temporal mismatch between costs-concentrated in the short run-and benefits, apparent on the medium and long run (type 2). On the one hand, such a mismatched repartition of costs and benefits reduces the political consensus for reforms, In these cases it is reasonable to put in place a financial instrument in order to provide adequate incentives for coordination and to support national ownership and implementation of agreed reforms. For incentive costs of the first type (insufficient fiscal space at a domestic level because of international and European commitments on deficit targets), it would be sufficient to engineer a gradual, ad-hoc loosening of the SGP, in order to allow the member state concerned the opportunity to amass the resources needed to implement the agreed reform. This is already in place thanks to the Commission communication on flexibility (COM 12/2015: 10) and only needs to be better linked, through secondary legislation, to CSRs. Addressing costs of types 2 and 3 may require a more complex solution. Mismatches between costs and benefits of reforms imply both real financial costs and political costs determined by the complexity of the construction of consensus towards the agreed reform. The latter often become financial costs as well as governments enact expenditure programmes to support citizens bearing the short-term costs of reforms. Of course, it is a national prerogative to decide whether it is worthier to gain the support of those penalized by a reform by enacting compensative measure or to strengthen its consensus in the rest of the constituency. However, both types of mismatches may hamper states' willingness to reform, which would end-up (in some cases but not in all) in generating negative spillovers across borders. When (1) national inaction is due to such mismatches and when (2) 
A joint budgetary procedure
The abovementioned instruments do not require treaty change, only the amendment of secondary legislation; however, the provision of financial incentives to reform is better E -114 divided in five distinct steps: inception, negotiations, finalisation, implementation and approval.
Joint Action: pooling finances
Joint actions would be organised, following the input from the Commission or the European Council, to deal with specific issues requiring pooling of resources. The lack of financial means is, indeed, one of the major limitations of the EMU, which lacks its own budget and is supported only by the 1% GDP EU budget, significantly lower than other fiscal federations (table 2 
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Coordinated Action: streamlining reforms
The second pillar of a JBP concerns the strengthened coordination of national budgets.
Strengthened coordination begins with an appropriate heading of the AGS identifying, by policy area, and (group of) countries, actions requiring enhanced coordination. Following the AGS, the Eurogroup would establish sectoral working groups covering each of the policy areas that are the object of strengthened coordination. Depending on the matter, only some countries may be required to join the working groups. Similarly, the European Parliament, through its existing powers of consultation with national parliaments (art. 13 TSCG), would invite the chairs of the competent committees of each parliament of the Eurozone to create a working group hosted by the EP, to work along the Eurogroup's own ministerial working group in each of the policy areas. The resulting inter-institutional task force would be led by a Commission representative. Each task force would aim to propose concrete actions for each member-state involved in a particular policy area, with the goal of achieving the desired degree of policy coordination. Strictly speaking, this is procedurally different from a process of policy harmonization because it is neither grounded on a legislative document nor requires member-states to abide by the same regulation.
Moreover, the task force may propose that member-states adopt a divergent course in certain policy areas in order to achieve a particular coordination objective-it might be the case, for example, of labour policy or public expenditure, where Eurozone-wide objectives are better achieved by a different composition of divergence rather than pure convergence among member states (IMF, 2012) . This joint task force would constitute an iterative process of negotiations leading to both a working-group and country-specific, detailed policy documents aimed at informing July's country-specific recommendations. Finalised recommendations would be directed to countries individually, and to working groups of countries, and would require the application of the specific content of the country-specific report in the yearly national budget. Both the working-group and the country-specific policy documents would include expenditure targets for specific areas, for both participating countries as a whole, and individual countries. As a general fiscal rule, the overall expenditure limit agreed within the coordinated Headings should not push the Euro Area as a whole above the 3% deficit/GDP target; it might, however, lead individual countries to temporarily over-shoot the target, as long as they implement their coordinated 
Conclusions
The formal and informal strengthening of Economic Governance (and of its master, the European Commission), analysed in the first part of this paper, suffers from two essential limitations: first, it is still not sufficient in providing a permanent setting for the EMU; and second, it lacks the democratic legitimacy to do so. Against this background, scheduled changes to governance, expected to be incrementally introduced in the next ten years, appear insufficient. Given the absence of Treaty Change, not expected before 2025, in the second part of the paper we have put together, elaborating from existing policy proposals, two alternatives to the current and expected setting which would be substantially more efficient. In the absence of Treaty change, no reform can be expected that increases The contractual agreements' proposal had been widely discussed in the literature and by policy-makers in the lead up to the December 2014 European Council. Its major strength is its limited range of action and the flexibility that characterizes its functioning.
However, it has three major drawbacks. First, its capacity of influencing policy-making is asymmetric; countries with limited need of reforms would be unaffected and would lack incentives to coordination. Second, it would imply "putting a price-tag on reforms" to countries thus creating a precedent in fields for which a case for financing does not exist.
Third, the system would not provide a suitable basis for a smooth transition towards a Euro Area Treasury expected for 2025, which is not likely to be anchored into contractualism. Therefore, while a limited contractual agreements scheme might work in fostering reforms in weak countries, it would not provide a suitable basis for smoothing the 10-year long transition towards a common Treasury. The JBP analysed in this paper merges several existing proposals, from the "Euro-Area Commissioner" to the "threefold model of fiscal union". The core element is to allow the Commission, through the AGS, to stimulate member-states, on the one hand, to set up ad-hoc, extra-MFF instruments to deal with specific functions, and, on the other hand, to proceed with strengthened coordination of certain economic policies. This approach differs from the Contractual Agreements' Mechanism, as the JBP is more suited as a transition instrument because it provides better coordination of the overall policies of EMU countries, decreasing divergence in view of the 2025 leap (which, accordingly with the Five Presidents' Report, will be conditional to successful convergence). Moreover, the two pillars of the procedure are designed to evolve, respectively, into a Euro Area budget and into forms of Eurobonds that guarantee enhanced coordination once Treaty change allows for it. Strengthened coordination in the form of a JBP, therefore, is to be preferred to a contractual agreements proposal in view of a smooth transition ahead of 2025.
 University of Trento. Email: Francesco.nicoli@unitn.it. I In fact, fiscal integration is a condition for the EMU to survive. This can be done explicitly and democratically, or implicitly through monetary backstop. De Grauwe and Ji (2013) , Sinn and Wollmerahausen (2012) , and Schelkle (2012) argue -from quite different perspectives-that the ECB'OMT and QE policies have achieved precisely this goal. 
